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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners respectfully refer the Court to the detailed Statement of Facts set forth in
Petitioners' opening brief. See Brief of Petitioners at 5-11.
ARGUMENT
The primary issue in this case is whether the July 31, 2000, decision of the
Department of Workforce Services (the "Department"), which found Gaylen Harris
("Harris") is Petitioners' employee for purposes of the Utah Employment Security Act (the
"Act"), is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Tasters Ltd v. Department of Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12,18 (UtahCt.
App. 1993), cert den. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). As set forth in Petitioners' opening brief,
and as addressed in Respondents' opposition brief, whether an individual is excluded from
coverage under the Act depends on whether the individual is (A) engaged in an independent
trade and (B) free from control and direction of the employer. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4204(3)(a) & (b).
A.

Engagement in Independent Trade

The Department's July 31, 2000, decision found Harris was Petitioners' employee
because he was not engaged in an independent trade. R. at 51-55. Whether one is engaged
in an independent trade is determined under seven factors set forth at Utah Administrative
Code R994-204-303(2)(b). As necessitated by Respondents' brief, each factor is addressed
in turn.

1

The first factor, separate place of business, was established by Harris' testimony that
he considered his home as a place of business. R. at 50(38:21-41). Indeed, Respondents
found Harris had a home office, see e.g. R. at 52, 190-91. The Respondents' brief even
concedes Harris' "home might be considered an independent place of business." Brief of
Respondents at 9.
The second factor is whether the individual "has a substantial investment in the tools
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services." Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Respondents inaccurately attempt to shift the
focus to "whether or not the individual supplied the tools and equipment" for his services.
Brief of Respondents at 9 (emphasis added). This is not the consideration set forth in the
rules, regardless of how "insignificant" Respondents deem the materials required by one in
Harris' profession. The irrefutable testimony before the Department was Harris owned all
the equipment necessary to perform his services. R. at 15; 50(38:21-23); and 50(38:37 to
39:20).
Third, whether the individual had other clients, was also established by Harris'
testimony. Nonetheless, Respondents speculate "it was more likely [Harris did not seek
additional clients] because he was required to work for Petitioner 40 hours per work." Brief
of Respondents at 9. Regardless of Respondents' interjection of motive completely
unsupported by any record evidence, see id., Harris' absolutely unrebutted testimony was it
is not unusual for a freelance accountant to work for one client. R. at 50(49:21-24).
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The fourth consideration is ability of the individual to suffer a profit or loss. Contrary
to Respondents' characterization of Petitioners' argument, it was asserted this factor was of
little relevance, not meaningless. It is true, as Respondents suggest, some professionals such
as attorneys are able to realize a profit by performing flat-fee type work. See Brief of
Respondents at 10. However, while conceding many bookkeepers are salaried, Respondents
focus too much on examples not applicable under our facts. Certainly, Respondents do not
suggest any professional paid on an hourly basis is necessarily an employee. Petitioners'
argument on this point is simply, under the facts of this case, the profit or loss measure is not
a clear indicator of an employment relationship based on the other factors.
Fifth, is whether Harris advertised his services. Again, Harris specifically testified his
primary means of promoting his freelance services was by word-of-mouth advertising. R. at
50(40:44-45, 45:3-16). Incredibly, Respondents contend Petitioners' recitation of the
evidence from the record is "inconsistent with the facts," Brief of Respondents at 11, and
then just five sentences later speculate once again as to Harris' motive, thus creating
Respondents' own "version" of the "facts." It is true, the Court must remember this is not a
case where Harris has sought unemployment benefits only to learn Petitioners neglected to
pay per the Act. Rather, this is an on-going relationship in which, even Respondents' own
field investigator clearly documented Harris is free to "do other work if he chooses." R. at
14. Harris utilized methods of advertising he thought adequate. The effectiveness, or lack
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thereof, of Harris' marketing abilities certainly cannot be determinative of an employment
relationship.
The sixth factor under engagement in independent trade is whether the individual had
a license. There is but one resolution of this issue: Harris had no license because no license
is required, to perform 'bookkeeping services. R at 50(35:25-27); 52.
The seventh and final factor is whether "the individual files self-employment and
other business tax forms

" Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(2)(b)(vii). Again, this

factor is overwIlelmingly in favor of Harris' status as engaged in an independent profession
because it is undisputed Harris routinelyfiledSchedule SE forms reporting self-employment
income.
Thus, under the seven factors identified for considering engagement in an independent
trade, the substantial weight of 1:1 le i ecord e\ idence weighs against Respondents'
determination that Harris is Petitioners' employee. Accordingly, the Department's July 31,
2000 decision that Harris is Petitioners' employee should be reversed.
B.

C'liiili'iil or direction

The second prong of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(b) focuses

hether the

individual is "free from control or direction over the means of performance." Respondents
contend the first three of eight factors, namely (1) instructions, (2) training, and (3) pace or
sequence, "are nol applicable to ;i east; involving peoplo who aie lured to perform support
services." Brief of Respondents at 14. Perhaps this is because these factors undeniably
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indicate Harris is not Petitioners' employee. Specifically, Petitioners provided Harris no
instruction regarding the performance of his services, see R. at 13, 15 & 50(58:12-15),
provided no training to Harris, R. at 13, 15, and there was no evidence Petitioners influenced
the pace or sequence of Harris' work. Thus, all three factors weigh decidedly against the
Department's July 31, 2000, decision.
The fourth control or direction factor is whether services are required on the
employer's premises. Harris did testify Moffat "required" him to be at workfromnine in the
morning until six at ni^ht However, in providing freelance services, this is entirely
consistent with Harris' pattern and practice. Specifically, Harris prefers to perform services
on site because doing so avoids the need to shuttle numerous client files to and from his
home office. R at 50(46:37-39). Further, Moffat indicated Harris was "free to come and go.
.. if he chooses." R. al i i.
The fifth control or direction factor is whether the employer requires services be
performed personally. Harris indecisively testified it was his "understanding" he was to
perform services personally, but he never pushed the issue because he has no employees he
could send in his place. R. at 50(54:1-18); R. at 13 (responding to personal service query: "I
think so though never was discussed."). The definitive record evidence comesfromMoffat's
negative answer to the Department investigator's question whether he required Harris
personally perform his services. R. at 15.
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The sixth control or direction factor considers the duration of the relationship between
the parties. Harris has performed services for Petitioners since 1996. During this time
period Harris performed similar services for others, albeit infrequently. R. at 12; 34;
50(17:16-38; 38:25-35; and 39:22-45).
The seventh measure of control or direction is \\ hethci the incJn iilual lutd set work
hours. As set forth in detail in the Brief of Petitioners, numerous factors weigh against an
employment relationship in this regard, not the least of which is Moffat's indication Harris
could col lie arid go as he pleased R at h 1- & 15.
The eighth control or direction factor considers method of payment. Petitioners paid
Harris twice a month. This payment "schedule" alone is not sufficient to overcome the
overwhelming weight of the evidence under the seven other factors demonstrating Harris was
not subject to Petitioners' control or direction.
Finally, Respondents string cite a host of cases noting "[e]mployer-employee
relationships were found" therein. See Brief of Respondents at 20. No explanation is given
of the facts of these cases, the reasoning relied oii iti deciding the cases, nor how they differ
in substance from the instant matter. See e.g. Bigfoot's, Inc. v. Industrial Comm % 710 P.2d
180, 181 (Utah 1985) (deciding case under now-inapplicable Utah Code Ann. § 35-422(j)(5)(B), which considered whether "the service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which the service is performed or that the service is performed oi itside all the
places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed"); Superior
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Cablevision Installers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm% 688 P 2d 444, 446-47 (Utah 1984)
(deciding case under former Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A) - (C)). As stated in State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998):
Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this
court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research."
Id. at 305 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because Respondents fail to either
develop the sti ii igofcitationssetfbr

,-. i

{

v reasoned analysis'thereof,

this Court should not look to the string-cited authority for resolution of the pending matter.
CONCLUSION
Under the Utah Administrative Code factors, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 35A4-204(3), the substantial weight of the evidence supports a conclusion Harris is engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as
involved in the contract of hire for services. Further, under the Administrative Code factors,
the substantial weight of the record evidence supports the conclusion Harris was free from
Petitioners' control or direction over the means of performance of his services. Because the
substantial weight of the record evidence does not support the Respondents' factual findings,
the Respondents' conclusion that Harris is Petitioners' employee is an arbitrary and
erroneous application of the law to the facts in this case.
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Accordingly, Petitioners

respectfully request this Court reverse the Department's determination that Harris is an
employee and subject to the terms of the Act.
DATED this \*~ day of August 2001.
WINDER & HASLAM

JOHK/WARREN MA Y ^
Atjopneys for Petitioners
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